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BUSINESS CONDITIONS AND OUTLOOK 
conomic statistics for the spring and summer of 
1975 confirmed that the recession of 1974-75 
was over and  revealed the vigorous beginning of 
the recovery. The recession was both the longest 
and deepest in the United States since the 1930's. 
The overall rate of unemployment peaked at more 
than 9 per cent of the civilian labor force, and the 
rate of capacity utilization in manufacturing fell to 
67 per cent. But in addition to the ills of recession, 
American  society  suffered  simultaneously  from 
some of the highest rates of inflation in its history. 
Indeed, the inflation was a major factor in the eco- 
nomic slump. It is important to keep these features 
of the immediate past in mind as one analyzes the 
outlook for economic recovery in 1976. 
THE  REC~VEWY  ON  197'5 
Real gross national product (GNP) grew only 
slightly in the second quarter of 1975-at less than a 
2 per cent annual rate-but  enough  to mark that 
period  as the initial  quarter of  the recovery.  The 
turnaround probably occurred at some time during 
the quarter: industrial production reached its  low 
point in April and the decline in total civilian em- 
ployment ended in March (both on a seasonally ad- 
justed basis). After allowing for price change, the 
rise in final purchases was composed of increases in 
personal  consumption  expenditures, net  exports, 
and government purchases, large enough to more 
than offset a decline in business fixed investment. 
(The change in residential construction spending, 
while positive, was very small.) But the quarterly 
increase in real GNP was smaller than the rise in real 
final sales because the liquidation of business in- 
ventories went on at a more rapid pace in the second 
quarter than in the first, thus making the inventory 
sector a continuing drag on overall output growth. 
The third quarter was a different story, how- 
ever, with several of the economy's  major sectors 
making significantly different contributions to the 
total. Real final purchases increased by nearly $10 
billion, slightly more than in the second quarter. In 
the third quarter, moreover, even though business in- 
ventories continued to be liquidated, the inventory 
sector ceased to be a drag on total output growth as 
the pace of liquidation slowed considerably. Within 
the final demand group, the private domestic sectors 
provided the thrust to growth: consumer spending 
continued  to  grow  strongly,  business  fixed  in- 
vestment ceased  its  decline, and  residential con- 
struction spending grew substantially. Government 
purchases increased  hardly at all, and net exports 
declined as import growth exceeded the growth of 
U. S. exports. This sectoral mix provided for real 
GNP growth in the third quarter at an annual rate of 
more than 13 per cent. 
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The recovery  in  total  economic  activity  and 
output was reflected in improved labor market con- 
ditions and in increased productivity. Quarterly av- 
erage unemployment rates for nearly all major labor 
force categories retreated in the third quarter from 
their second quarter cyclical peaks. For example, 
the overall rate of civilian unemployment fell from 
8.9 per cent to 8.4 per cent and the rate for all house- 
hold heads declined from 6.1 per cent to 5.7 per 
cent.  Nonfarm payroll employment also rose sub- 
stantially in the third quarter, and the average length 
of  workweek edged upward.  But the  increase in 
output  so far  outstripped  the  increase  in  hours 
worked that output per hour in the nonfarm sector 
posted its largest quarterly gain since early 1961. 
This second consecutive quarterly increase in pro- 
ductivity, to be expected eariy in a recovery, fol- 
lowed several quarters of substantial decline. When 
these rates of  productivity increase were coupled 
with the recent  pattern  of  moderating rates of in- 
crease in compensation per hour, the result was a 
dramatic change from high rates of increase in unit 
labor costs to an actual decline. That, in turn, was 
reflected in a similarly dramatic decline in the rate 
of increase of the implicit price deflator for the pri- 
vate nonfarm economy, from 1  1.1 per cent in 1974 
to an annual rate of slightly more than 4 per cent in 
the second and third quarters of 1975. 
The total GNP deflator has also shown a sharp 
decline in its rate of increase during 1975 (though 
not as dramatic a shift as that for the private nonfarm 
economy).  During the five quarters of falling real 
output (all of 1974 and the first quarter of 1975), the 
GNP deflator rose at an annual rate of 11.3 per cent; 
in the second and third quarters of 1975 the annual 
rate of increase averaged just under 5 per cent. (The 
GNP implicit price deflator is influenced by changes 
in the composition of output. A GNP fixed-weighted 
price index showed the following annual rates of in- 
crease in the first three quarters of  1975: 7.5 per 
cent, 5.5  per cent, and 6.8 per cent.) Price increases 
as measured by  the Consumer Price Index  (CPI) 
have also been smaller in 1975 than in 1974. How- 
ever,  after a sharp decline  in the first quarter of 
1975, the quarterly average rate of increase in the 
CPI was above that of the preceding quarter in both 
the second and third quarters of the year. 
UWE OMPLOOK FOR  1976 
As the recovery proceeds, the roles of the var- 
ious sectors of  the economy  may  be expected  to 
change further. The contribution of the inventory 
sector, for example, is likely to be of less relative 
importance to overall growth in the near future. Liq- 
uidation  may  well  give  way  to  renewed  accu- 
mulation around the turn of the year as stocks are 
brought into line with sales. The extent to which in- 
ventory investment  will enhance total real growth 
will,  of  course,  depend  on  businessmen's  ex- 
pectations about the growth of sales and about the 
effects of the recovery on the rate of inflation and 
the possibility of shortages. Moderation in the rate 
of  recovery  would  be  expected  to restrain  the 
growth of inventories on all three counts. 
Personal  consumption  expenditures  (along 
with inventory change) may be given considerable 
credit for the bottoming-out of the economy and its 
early recovery. The improved performance of real 
disposable personal income, attributable partly to a 
moderating rate of inflation and to personal income 
tax  reductions,  provided  consumers  the  where- 
withal for increasing purchases of goods and ser- 
vices, especially durable goods. Without a return to 
rates of  inflation  like  those of  1973-74,  and as- 
suming  at  least  a  continuation  of  the  personal 
income tax reductions of 1975 (on a full-year basis), 
increases  in  manhours  worked should occur,  re- 
sulting in a solid growth in real disposable income. 
If so, personal consumption spending is likely to 
continue to grow enough to provide a firm under- 
pinning for the economy's continued recovery. 
Although  the  turnaround  in  residential  con- 
struction  was  rather late  in  the  cycle,  private 
housing starts in September 1975 were about 40 per 
cent above their low at the close of 1974 and resi- 
dential construction spending contributed  signifi- 
cantly to the third quarter's growth in total output. It 
is not clear, however, that strong growth in home- 
building can be sustained through 1976. The series 
on building permits is recovering from its cyclical 
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trough but is still at a historically rather low level, 
and questions must be raised about the underlying 
demand for housing at current high prices. 
Finally,  there is the question of sufficient fi- 
nancing  for  residential  construction.  Inflows of 
funds to thrift institutions (the major source of that 
financing)  were  very  strong  through  most of  the 
summer of 1975, permitting the advance in home- 
building that occurred.  But the situation seems to 
have changed  somewhat since late summer.  Net 
new  savings  received  by  savings  and  loan  in- 
stitutions appear to have increased less than season- 
ally  in  August  and  September,  but  rebounded 
substantially  in  October.  These  movements  ap- 
parently  reflected  an  increase  in  market  interest 
rates which was later reversed. Whether rates will 
again rise enough to hamper the inflow of deposits 
to these institutions will depend on the pace of the 
economic  recovery  and  the  course  of  monetary 
policy. Should homebuilding activity slow mark- 
edly  (or,  worse,  cease to  grow),  the  overall  re- 
covery would be weakened considerably. 
Business  spending  for  fixed  investment  suf- 
fered greatly from the recession,  declining at an 
annual  rate  of  nearly  10 per  cent  in  real  terms 
through 1974 and the first three quarters of 1975. 
The  decline  appears  to  have  ended  in  the  third 
quarter of 1975. Rising profits as the recovery pro- 
gresses will be a positive influence on business cap- 
ital  spending  in  1976.  However,  fairly  strong 
growth in final demand for output will be required 
to justify very rapid expansion in fixed investment, 
given the low rate of utilization of existing plant. 
Advance  indicators,  such as new  orders of  non- 
defense capital goods industries, are not yet giving 
unambiguous  signals of  substantial  increases  in 
fixed investment spending. The McGraw-Hill fall 
survey of  business spending  plans for new  plant 
and equipment in 1976 suggests a minimal real in- 
crease in business fixed investment. 
Net  exports,  and  government  purchases  of 
goods and services, are the remaining final demand 
sectors to be considered. Net exports supported the 
recovery in its early stages, but with the recoveries 
here and abroad proceeding out of phase with one 
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another, a reduction in that support is expected in 
1976. Federal purchases are likely to increase only 
modestly,  as  are  those  of  state  and  local  gov- 
ernments.  Little stimulus to economic activity in 
1976  may  be counted  on from  increased  gov- 
ernment.demand for output. Thus, private domestic 
final demand is likely to be the key to the outlook for 
real economic growth in 1976. 
Discussion of the outlook by sector suggests an 
overall pattern that might include a growth in real 
GNP  of  about  4  to 6  per  cent  from  the  end  of 
1975 to the end of  1976. Such a pace would be 
slower than in four-quarter periods in similar stages 
of  most  postwar  recoveries,  and  considerably 
slower than that achieved in the last half of 1975. 
Growth at a 5 per cent rate, which is only slightly 
faster than  the economy's  long-run  trend rate of 
growth, would continue to close the large gap be- 
tween  actual  and  potential  real  GNP that  was 
opened by the recession (Chart 1). But because the 
gap is .so large, the economy would remain a long 
way from full employment of its industrial and labor 
resources at the end of 1976. One measure of the 
degree of underutilization of resources, the overall 
unemployment rate, may be estimated from the size 
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of  the  GNP gap  by  using  a  convenient rule  of 
thumb.'  In this illustration, the unemployment rate 
at the end of 1976 might be expected to fall near the 
midpoint of a range of 7.5 to 8.5 per cent. Thus, re- 
covery through 1976 at a rate near 5 per cent would 
still leave a large'disparity between what the U. S. 
economy would be capable of producing and what 
it would actually be producing. 
The continued existence of a lot of slack in the 
economy by the end of 1976 (and the modest speed 
at which the gap is expected to be reduced) has im- 
portant implications  for the rate at which the general 
price level may be expected to rise. There is little 
reason to believe that the illustrated growth of ag- 
gregate demand would put enough pressure on the 
resource base, given the amount of idle capacity (in- 
cluding labor) existent at the end of 1975 and ex- 
pected at the end of 1976, to bring undue upward 
pressure on the rate of inflation in 1976, or even in 
1977. As earlier cost increases were passed through 
and some catch-up in wage rates occurred, inflation 
rates remained high in 1974 in  the face of a large 
quantity of  underused  resources.  Many  of  these 
lagged effects appear to be over, however, as are the 
more direct impacts of the runup of food and fuel 
prices in 1973-74. The year 1976 is likely to be a 
year of rising productivity and, at worst, stable to 
slightly rising unit labor costs-if  labor compen- 
sation increases continue to be of reasonable size in 
spite of  a heavy collective bargaining calendar. If 
so, these features should combine to produce a rate 
of increase in the general price level well below a 
double-digit level, 
There is, of course, the possibility of further ex- 
ogenous shocks to the economy and to the rate of in- 
flation from large increases in the prices of food and 
fuel, especially oil. At this time, it appears that in- 
creases in food and oil prices will be much smaller 
than those of 1973-74. Food prices in the United 
States rose 14 per cent in both 1973 and 1974, and 
an estimated 9 per  cent in  1975. The U. S. De- 
partment of Agriculture estimated in November that 
l/The relationship known as "Okun's Law" suggests that a  I  percentage 
point reduction in  the unemployment rate  is associated with a 3.2 per- 
centage point reduction in the GNP  gap expressed as a per cent of actual 
GNP. 
retail food prices will rise at a 5 per cent annual rate 
in the first half of  1976. Whether or not this par- 
ticular estimate is on the mark, it is clear that the 
overall agricultural situation now differs from that 
in the earlier years, in terms of both domestic har- 
vests and export demands, in such a way that price 
increases of that earlier magnitude are less likely to 
occur. 
The increase of about 10 per cent in the price of 
crude oil, announced by the Organization of Petro- 
leum Exporting Countries in the fall of 1975, was 
near the low end of the range of earlier expectations. 
While that increase will have an  impact on world! 
energy prices, it will be both less than many ob- 
servers had expected and  much less than that of 
1973-74. At the same time, however, failure to re- 
solve  the question of  decontrol of  domestic  oil 
prices and the related question of the future of the $2 
tax on imported oil, leaves considerable uncertainty 
about the future of energy costs in the United States. 
Decontrol accomplished over a period as long as 39 
months (proposed earlier by  the  Administration) 
would spread the effect over a longer period than 
would abrupt decontrol. A conclusion of  cautious 
optimism seems  warranted about  the  impact  of 
rising food and fuel prices in 1976, both on the rate 
of inflation and on the growth of consumers' real 
income. 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OMBLOCATIONS 
In  1976,  the  course  of  inflation  and  the 
economy will affect and be affected by financial de- 
velopments. This section discusses the ways that fi- 
nancial and economic variables may interact as the 
year unfolds. A brief review of 1975 sets the stage 
for the treatment of  prospective events. 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPAAENTS QN  8 995 
Interaction  between financial  and  economic 
variables  was  quite  evident  in  1975.  The  first 
quarter decline in  production and  the rate of  in- 
flation was  accompanied by  a sharp drop in  the 
demand for money and credit. Falling monetary de- 
mands contributed to the decline in  interest rates 
that occurred in the first quarter. At the same time, 
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Chart 2  however, counteracted some of the upward pressure 
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that monetary  growth slowed sharply in the July- 
September period. Nevertheless, for the second and 
third  quarters  combined  the  narrowly  defined 
money supply  increased  at a seasonally adjusted 
annual rate of around 8 per cent. While the 8 per 
cent rate is somewhat less than the spring-summer 
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declining production and sluggish monetary growth 
encouraged an increasingly accommodative  mon- 
etary policy. Monetary accommodation helped re- 
verse the sluggish growth in the money supply and 
contributed to the drop in interest rates. The decline 
in rates was quite pronounced, especially in short- 
term markets. The Federal funds rate, for example, 
fell from around 8.5 per cent in late 1974 to around 
5.5 per cent at the end of March. Long-term rates 
declined also but'to a lesser extent. (See Chart 2.) 
Rebounding economic  activity  in  the second 
and  third  quarters  helped  reverse  the  downward 
movement  in  short-term  interest  rates.  Con- 
sequently,  short-term  rates increased in the latter 
part of the second quarter and moved up somewhat 
further in the third quarter. Rapid monetary growth, 
Short-term interest rates declined early in the 
fourth quarter.  By early December,  for example, 
the Federal funds rate was around 5.25 per cent. The 
recent drop in interest rates was due partly to a more 
accommodative monetary  policy. Greater accom- 
modation  reflected  policymakers'  concern  about 
continued sluggish monetary growth. The accom- 
modation developed at a time when financial mar- 
kets  were  faced  with  increasing  uncertainty 
associated with the financial problems of New York 
City. 
Developments in 1975 show that changing eco- 
nomic  and  monetary  conditions  sometimes  have 
little immediate impact in changing long-term in- 
terest rates. Despite sharp movements in production 
and variations in the pace of monetary growth, long- 
term interest rates fluctuated within a narrow range 
in  1975.  For example,  during  most of  the  year, 
yields on Aaa utility bonds ranged between 9 and 
9.6 per cent. Relative stability in long-term interest 
rates  reflected a  balancing of  several conflicting 
factors. In the first part of the year, downward pres- 
sures from economic weakness, declining inflation, 
and falling short-term rates were countered  by ef- 
forts of businesses to lengthen the maturity structure 
of  liabilities.  Efforts  to  restructure  liabilities  led 
businesses to borrow  heavily in  capital  markets. 
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After midyear, businesses reduced their long-term 
borrowing. At about the same time, however, the 
U. S. Treasury  began  borrowing heavily  in  both 
money.and capital markets. Increased Treasury bor- 
rowing along with the economic turnaround tended 
to counter  the downward  pressures on long-term 
rates produced by reduced private borrowing. In ad- 
dition, sharp midyear jumps in wholesale and retail 
prices reinforced inflationary expectations and less- 
ened downward pressures on long-term rates em- 
anating from earlier declines in the rate of inflation. 
FONANCBAL DEVELOPMENTS ON  1976 
As in 1975, financial markets in 1976 will be 
importantly  affected  by  the ongoing  recovery  in 
business.activity.  As production expands, demands 
for  money  and  credit  will  be  increasing.  These 
rising monetary  demands will  be placing upward 
pressures on interest rates. Continued economic re- 
covery in 1976, however, may not necessarily be 
accompanied  by  rising  interest  rates.  While ex- 
perience shows that interest rates rise at some point 
in the expansion phases of business cycles, rates do 
not always increase in the first several quarters of 
economic upturns. For example, interest rates de- 
clined for several quarters after the 1969 recession 
ended and rose only moderately following the end 
of the 1960-61 recession. 
Factors in addition to the business recovery will 
be affecting financial markets in 1976. Continued 
price inflation, for example, will be adding to the 
amount of  money and  credit  the public  needs  to 
transact business. The resulting increases in mon- 
etary demands will be augmenting the upward pres- 
sures that rising production will be placing on in- 
terest  rates.  The  added  pressure  could  be  quite 
pronounced if the rate of price inflation accelerates 
significantly. Barring a large step-up in the rate of 
inflation, however, financial market pressures em- 
anating  from  inflationary  developments  may 
remain moderate. 
Interest rates in 1976 also will be affected by 
the availability of money and credit. Rising mon- 
etary availability will tend to counteract the upward 
pressures  on  interest  rates  emanating from  in- 
creasing production  and prices. The resulting be- 
havior of interest rates will depend on the extent that 
rising production and prices stimulate monetary de- 
mands, compared with the extent of the increase in 
the supply of  money and credit. 
Monetary  availability  will  be  largely  de- 
termined by the conduct of monetary  policy. The 
Federal Reserve intends to conduct policy so that 
the  monetary  aggregates expand in line with tar- 
geted  growth  rates  that  have  been  publicly  an- 
nounced. For example, the narrowly defined money 
supply,  M1,  has  been  targeted  to  expand  at  an 
annual rate between 5 and 7.5 per cent. 
As the money supply expands within the tar- 
geted range, money is likely to expand less rapidly 
in 1976 than the overall economy. In other words, 
money will probably grow less rapidly than nominal 
gross national product (GNP),  which will  be re- 
flecting the increase in both production and prices. 
A less rapid growth in  money than in the overall 
economy, or in nominal GNP, means that the turn- 
over or velocity of money will be increa~ing.~ 
Rising  velocity  is  frequently  associated  with 
rising interest rates because the demand for money 
tends to increase in line with the overall economy. 
When velocity is increasing-that is, when money 
is growing less rapidly than the overall economy- 
monetary  availability  tends  to  grow  less  rapidly 
than monetary demand. The shortfall in availability 
places upward pressure on interest rates. Rising in- 
terest rates encourage the public to economize on 
money  holdings,  thereby  creating  a  balance  be- 
tween the demand for and supply of  money. 
For various reasons, however, rising velocity is 
not  always  associated  with  rising  interest  rates. 
During the first several quarters of  economic  up- 
turns,  for example, velocity  invariably increases, 
but  interest rates  sometimes  fail  to rise.  As eco- 
nomic recovery begins, several factors may temper 
increases in monetary demand and allow velocity to 
increase  without  putting  upward  pressure  on  in- 
terest rates. The business sector is frequently in a fa- 
2IVelocity is the ratio of nominal GNP to the money supply. Therefore, if 
the money supply increases less rapidly than nominal GNP, velocity in- 
creases.  Velocity declines if the  money supply  increases more rapidly 
than nominal  GNP. 
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vorable position with regard to liquidity.  In addi- 
tion, businesses are typically anticipating that rising 
profits will be augmenting their cash flows. These 
factors may induce firms to maintain relatively low 
money balances, so that  monetary demands  may 
tend  to expand  less  rapidly  than  the overall 
economy. 
Interest rate behavior during the first part of re- 
coveries depends partly on the magnitude of the rise 
in velocity.  Relatively small increases in  velocity 
tend to be accompanied by moderate increases or 
even declines in interest rates. Similarly, relatively 
large increases in velocity tend to be accompanied 
by relatively sharp increases in interest rates. Thus, 
in the first year following the 1969 recession, ve- 
locity rose arelatively moderate 2.5 per cent and in- 
terest rates declined. In the first year after the 1960- 
61 recession, velocity rose more-5.6 per cent- 
and interest rates increased  moderately.  Both ve- 
locity and interest rates jumped sharply in the first 
several quarters following the 1953-54 and 1957-58 
recessions. 
If  economic activity  advances  at a  moderate 
pace during the current recovery's initial phase, the 
rise in velocity may be moderate. In this case, the 
first part of  the recovery+ncompassing  perhaps 
the period from mid-  1975 through 1976-may  be 
accompanied by stable or  only moderately rising in- 
terest rates. A moderate increase in economic ac- 
tivity at an annual rate of around 6 per cent from 
mid-1975 through 1976 may be associated with a 
rise in velocity between 4.5  and 7 per cent. Velocity 
increases within this range assume an inflation rate 
around 6 per cent and a money growth rate within 
the targeted 5 to 7.5 per cent range. Experience sug- 
gests that velocity increases toward the lower end of 
the 4.5 to 7  per cent range'are  compatible with 
stable or moderately rising interest rates. Given the 
6 per cent economic growth rate and the 6 per cent 
inflation rate, velocity increases toward the low end 
of the 4.5 to 7 per cent range imply a money growth 
rate toward  the upper end of the 5 to 7.5 per cent 
range.3 
It should be noted that a 6 per cent economic 
growth rate over the mid-1975 through 1976 period 
implies a lower growth rate in 1976 because the rate 
exceeded 6 per cent in the last half of 1975. Thus, 
the  assumption  of  a  6  per  cent  growth  rate  in 
the economy over the first six quarters of  the re- 
covery implies about a 5 per cent growth rate for 
1976 as a whole. As noted in the section on the busi- 
ness outlook, a 5  per cent economic growth rate 
would be consistent with the pattern of business ac- 
tivity projected to emerge in 1976. 
A continuation into 1976 of the rapid economic 
growth rate experienced in  the last  half  of  1975 
would likely be accompanied by sharply rising ve- 
locity and interest rates. In addition, with produc- 
tion expanding sharply, inflation likely would ac- 
celerate.  Vigorous  economic  growth  into  1976 
would significantly reduce unemployment levels. A 
moderate pace may be more desirable in the long 
run, though, as a vigorous recovery may be short- 
lived. 
The rise  in interest  rates and accelerated  in- 
flation likely to accompany a rapid recovery would 
create  severe  financial  distortions  and  strains. 
These difficulties  would  adversely  affect  the 
economy and possibly terminate the recovery.  In 
the face of rapid economic growth and accelerating 
inflation,  the  Federal  Reserve could  temporarily 
hold  down  interest  rates  by  boosting  the  money 
growth  rate.  Rapid  monetary  growth,  however, 
would add to long-run  inflationary  pressures  and 
thereby endanger a sustainable business expansion. 
3/Since velocity equals the ratio of nominal GNP tothe money supply, the 
growth rate of velocity approximately equals the growth rate of nominal 
GNP minus the growth rate of the money supply. The growth rate of nom- 
inal GNP is approximately  equal to the inflation rate plus the economic 
growth rate. Thus, the growth rate of velocity approximately equals the in- 
flation rate plus the economic growth rate minus the money growth rate. 
For example, if the inflation rate is 6 per cent, theeconomic growth rate is 
6 per cent, and the money growth rate is 7.5 per cent, the growth rate of 
velocity is approximately 6+6 -7.5,  or 4.5 per cent. 
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eeping in step with the'economy, agricultural 
conditions have improved considerably during 
the second half  of  1975.  After bottoming out in 
March,  prices received by  farmers began to rise 
sharply in  response to diminishing red meat sup- 
plies and to rising total demand, especially in the 
foreign sector. This uptrend in prices was finally in- 
terrupted  in  October  when  huge  grain  harvests 
caused average farm prices to drop one-half of  1  per 
cent. However, as a result of improved prices, the 
net farm income picture for 1975 has  turned out 
much better than originally expected. Current es- 
timates indicate that 1975 net farm income will be 
approximately $25 billion, as compared with $27.7 
billion in 1974. Most of the 1975 decline is attrib- 
utable  to  yet  another  rise  in  production  costs, 
which will probably exceed the $73.4 billion spent 
in 1974 by about $3.5 billion. 
The brighter agricultural picture that has de- 
veloped in the last several months reflects various 
adjustments in farm output and improvements  in the 
general economy. In the crop sector, for example, 
greatly  improved  growing  and  harvesting  con- 
ditions  pushed  production  sharply  above  1974 
levels when yields were plagued by spring floods, a 
summer drought, and early frosts. New production 
records  were  established for  corn  and  wheat  in 
1975, and soybean output-while falling somewhat 
short of the 1.55 billion bushels produced in 1973- 
jumped about 23 per cent above last year's weather 
damaged crop. Although prices declined seasonally 
during the harvest period, precipitous drops were 
avoided because of the relatively tight world grain 
situation and  the excellent  prospects  for  foreign 
sales.  Without  foreign  markets  to  absorb  the 
bumper crops, U. S. farmers would obviously be re- 
ceiving very low prices for their grain in the 1975- 
76 marketing year. 
Livestock producers have also made significant 
adjustments in output. During the first 9 months of 
1975, for example, total red meat production was 
about 3 per cent less than in the comparable year- 
earlier period. However, virtually all of the drop in 
output occurred in the hog industry as beef supplies 
exceeded  1974'levels by  3 per cent. These adjust- 
ments reflect the sharp deterioration in  profits in 
1974 which induced livestock producers to start liq- 
uidating  their  breeding herds.  Since the  hog  in- 
dustry adjusted rather quickly, farrowings and mar- 
keting~  in 1975 have fallen very sharply, running as 
much as 20 per cent below year-earlier levels. How- 
ever, cattle producers-who also began to adjust 
herd size in 1974-are  still in the liquidation pro- 
cess,  which  explains  the small  increase in  beef 
output this year. 
The strong recovery in  the economy and the 
prospects for continued expansion, as summarized 
in  the companion article in this Review,  have also 
bolstered the agricultural sector in recent months. 
Since the end of the recession in the second quarter, 
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personal incomes and employment have risen sig- 
nificantly, reflecting consumers'  increased ability to 
spend. To the extent that consumers have directed a 
portion of  their higher incomes toward food con- 
sumption, farm prices and incomes have no doubt 
benefited. 
Given the turnaround in the economy and the 
prospects for continued growth in 1976, domestic 
demand for agricultural  commodities should 
strengthen in the year ahead. Certainly, the natural 
growth in population and rising disposable incomes 
will have a positive effect, but any reduction in food 
stamp benefits in 1976 would be partly offsetting. 
Nevertheless, given the outlook for agricultural ex- 
ports,  the  total  demand  picture  for  farm  com- 
modities  is  excellent.  On the  supply  side,  farm 
producers will likely continue to make~adjustments 
in  their  production  programs  for  both  crops and 
livestock. Total meat supplies are expected to in- 
crease somewhat above 1975 levels, mostly on the 
strength of an expansion in beef and poultry output. 
However,  if  the  relationship  between  production 
costs and hog prices remains favorable for the next 
few months, the production of  pork in 1976 may 
also exceed the 1975 level. 
The key to 1976 crop production will probably 
be the weather since total acreage will not change 
appreciably. Over the last few years, virtually all of 
the idled cropland that  had  been  held  in  reserve 
under various farm programs has been brought back 
into production. Since the Secretary of Agriculture 
has announced that there will be no set aside re- 
quirements for 1976, farmers may cultivate as much 
land as they wish. However, the constraints on land 
availability coupled  with  uncertainties about pro- 
duction costs, the weather, and new export policies 
will likely temper, if not preclude, a significant ex- 
pansion in crop acreage. Therefore, the realization 
of higher production levels in 1976 will require fur- 
ther improvements in yields, which implies nearly 
ideal  weather, or the substitution of  one crop for 
another. Given recent price relationships, there is a 
strong possibility that corn and perhaps cotton acre- 
age will increase at the expense of soybean acre- 
age in  1976. 
The volume of farm marketings in 1976 is ex- 
pected  to be moderately larger  than  in  1975  as- 
suming  that  the  crops  are  good.  Although  the 
demand prospects are strong, large supplies of farm 
products will likely create some downward pressure 
on prices, especially during the second half of the 
year  when  livestock  production  starts expanding 
more rapidly. In view of the demand structure for 
most agricultural commodities, which tends to be 
relatively  price inelastic,  any gain in  1976 gross 
farm income over 1975's estimated level of $103 bil- 
lion will likely be small. Although production costs 
are not expected to rise sharply during the coming 
year, they probably  will increase enough to erode 
any gains in gross receipts,  leaving net income a 
little below the 1975 figure. Barring any unforeseen 
shocks, therefore,  the net income situation in agri- 
culture should stack up quite well by historical stan- 
dards in the coming year, resulting in either the third 
or fourth best year on record.  Furthermore,  live- 
stock producers will probably enjoy a larger share 
of total farm income than they received in 1975. 
An End to Rising Food  Prices? 
For all of 1975, it is estimated that food prices 
will average about 9 per cent above the 1974 av- 
erage, which compares with increases of 14 per cent 
in each of the 2 previous years. Thus, some prog- 
ress  has  been  made  in  slowing  the  rate  of  in- 
crease in food prices in the last year. A continuation 
of this trend will require that prices at the farm level 
either stabilize or fall in  the  year ahead and that 
farm-to-retail price spreads do not widen unduly. 
Earlier this year, great concern was expressed 
about the probable impact on food prices of large 
grain sales to Russia. Many recalled that the 1972 
episode with Russia resulted  in  a heavy runoff of 
grain stocks and a sharp rise in prices at both the 
farm and food retail levels. Coming as it did, this 
runup in prices exacerbated the inflationary forces 
at work in the economy and produced an outcry for 
closer controls on exports.  Quite naturally, there- 
fore, the public remains very sensitive about Rus- 
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sian forays in  the U. S. market, which partly ex- 
plains  the  moratorium  on  grain  sales  that  was 
imposed  in  August.  In  analyzing  the  probable 
impact on food  prices,  the  Department  of  Agri- 
culture has indicated that the large grain sales made 
to Russia this past summer will boost food prices 
about 1.5 per cent higher than they otherwise would 
be in 1976. 
Considering the outlook for farm prices in the 
year  ahead,  there  is  a  good  possibility  that  the 
upward pressures on food prices resulting from the 
Russian grain sale will be nearly offset by price de- 
clines at the farm level if supplies materialize as ex- 
pected. Therefore, the issue of food prices in 1976 
will depend largely on what happens to the farm-to- 
retail price spread. Following a 20 per cent jump in 
1974,  marketing  spreads  for assembling,  pro- 
cessing, transporting, and distributing are expected 
to average about 8 per cent higher in 1975. In 1976, 
the farm-to-retail margin will no doubt widen once 
more  to  cover  higher  marketing  and  processing 
costs. The question is-how  much? Although his- 
torical evidence shows that significant year-to-year 
deviations may occur, marketing margins tend to 
reflect the general rate of inflation because the food 
industry is basically service oriented. The economic 
recovery will probably result in a higher demand for 
built-in  food  services,  which  will  likely  lead  to 
wider spreads and higher food prices, but it is hoped 
that economic conditions will be stable enough in 
the year ahead to remove some of the impetus for 
ever-widening marketing margins. If so, 1976 food 
prices should conform more closely to the general 
rate of inflation, which promises to be moderate. 
Hence, the rate of  increase in food  prices in  the 
coming year likely will be less than the 9 per cent 
rise posted in 1975. 
Foreign Demand to Continue Strong 
Although the availability of U. S. grain stocks 
has increased sharply  this  year, the prospects for 
world trade are more favorable than a year ago be- 
cause of production shortfalls in several major pro- 
ducing countries, particularly in the Soviet Union. 
Thus,  the  volume  of  agricultural  exports  in  the 
Chart  1 
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1975-76 fiscal year promises to exceed the previous 
year's level by a wide margin-perhaps as much as 
15 to 20 per cent. Prices, however, are expected to 
average  somewhat  lower  in  the  current  period, 
which will offset some of the gains in volume. Still, 
foreign sales should surpass the record $2 1.6 billion 
posted in fiscal 1975 and provide another large sur- 
plus  in  the  trade  balance  for  agricultural  com- 
modities (Chart  1).  The surplus from agricultural 
trade has amounted to about $12 billion in each of 
the last 2 fiscal years, up from $5.6 billion in fiscal 
1973. Moreover, the expected surplus in the current 
period also should equal, if not surpass, the $12 bil- 
lion level. Obviously, the sharp expansion in agri- 
cultural exports has been extremely beneficial to the 
United States in balancing the payments associated 
with international trade. 
In the last fiscal year, the volume of agricultural 
exports declined about 15 per cent due largely to the 
small  harvests  in  1974.  Nevertheless,  wheat and 
feed grain sales posted new highs, reaching $5 bil- 
lion and $4.7  billion,  respectively.  Rice exports, 
rising 3  3 per cent, broke the $1 billion mark for the 
first time. However, cotton and soybean exports fell 
21 per cent and 9 per cent, respectively, because of 
reductions in demand. Reflecting the worldwide re- 
cession  in  1974-75,  sales  to  Japan-the  largest 
single market for U. S. agricultural exports-fell 
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about 5 per cent in the last fiscal year to a level of 
$3.2 billion. Interestingly, total sales to both Russia 
and China amounted to less than $800 million, down 
sharply  from the $1.35  billion shipped  in  fiscal 
1974. 
A Word About Grain Agreements 
While creating a storm of controversy, the 5- 
year grain agreement recently  consummated  with 
the Soviet Union merely represents another chapter 
in  the  long  history  of  agricultural  trade  policy. 
Almost from the beginning, the Government has in- 
fluenced,  if  not  controlled, the  conditions  under 
which American farm commodities could enter in- 
ternational markets. However, the stance on trade 
policy has changed from time to time, varying from 
strong protectionist policies, as championed by the 
Smoot-Hawley tariffs in the  1930's, to programs 
that  have sought  to  liberalize  trade  barriers  and 
expand foreign markets. In addition, considerable 
effort has gone into developing programs that pro- 
vide  needy  countries  with  food. and  other  farm 
products  on  a  concessional  basis.  Hence,  many 
people are apprehensive  about the  Russian  grain 
agreement because it seems to conflict with a gen- 
eral  policy  of  market  expansion  for  agricultural 
commodities. 
Before such a conclusion is reached, however, 
the terms of the agreement should be analyzed care- 
fully. Beginning October  1,  1976, Russia will be 
committed  to  purchase  annually,  for  the  next 5 
years, at least 6 million  metric tons of wheat and 
corn in approximately equal proportions. If  Amer- 
ican grain stocks exceed 225 million tons, Russia 
may purchase an additional 2 million tons without 
prior consultation with the U.S. Government. Fur- 
thermore, it is expected that purchases and ship- 
ments will be spaced as evenly as possible over each 
12-month period. If  U.S. grain stocks should fall 
below  225  million  tons,  a  highly  unlikely  de- 
velopment based on historical evidence,,an "escape 
clause" will permit the United States to reduce the 
quantity of grain sold to the Soviet Union.below the 
6 million ton minimum.  Similarly, any desire by 
either party  to go beyond the 8 million  ton  max- 
imum will require additional consultations before 
the sales are made. The agreement only applies to 
corn and wheat, which means that trade may occur 
in other commodities without restrictions. Finally, 
no concessional credit will be provided by the U.S. 
Government to finance Russia's  purchases. 
As with any agreement,  there are advantages 
and disadvantages. On the positive side, the Rus- 
sian grain agreement may remove much of the emo- 
tionalism that has characterized earlier transactions. 
At a minimum, the agreement promises to smooth 
out Russia's buying patterns for the next few years, 
to help her build up grain reserves during good crop 
years,  and  to  partly  reduce  the  wide  price fluc- 
tuations in U.S. grain markets, assuming that sales 
to other countries do not vary unduly. Greater price 
stability not only will allow grain producers to make 
better decisions but will also offer some protection 
to the  livestock industry against sharp  runups in 
feed costs. Moreover, the steady flow of grain to the 
Soviet Union over the next 5 years will result in a 
substantial amount of foreign exchange to help re- 
lieve some of  the pressure on the balance of pay- 
ments problem. 
On the negative side, the quantity limits spec- 
ified  in  the  agreement  have  a  relatively  narrow 
range and, as such, are tantamount to export con- 
trols. While it can be argued that Russia's access to 
U.S. markets should not go unchecked due to her 
proclivities  for  making  massive purchases  within 
short time periods, a maximum limit higher than the 
8 million tons would still act as a constraint and, at 
the same time, provide a wider range within which 
the pricing system could operate. As it now stands, 
the Soviet Union has a strong incentive to glean the 
world market before coming to the United States to 
negotiate for additional quantities above the max- 
imum limit. Although most of these lost sales would 
probably be offset by larger grain shipments to third 
countries, the net effect of this policy is to make the 
United States a residual supplier of grain. 
A  more disturbing  ramification,  however,  is 
that an element of competition has been removed 
from the marketplace. Now that an agreement has 
been reached with Russia, in addition to the Japa- 
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nese grain agreement that was reached earlier this 
year calling for minimum shipments of 14 million 
metric  tons a  year  for  3  years,  other  countries 
wishing to line up supplies from the United States 
will likely seek similar commitments. Hence, this 
carving  up of  the  export  market among  various 
countries would tend to reduce the aggressiveness 
of buyers in the marketplace, which might result in 
lower bids on the grain that is for sale. Such an ar- 
rangement would obviously be the ultimate form of 
export controls. 
COAAAAODIPY  OUTLOOK  FOR  1976 
The important ingredients in the 1976 outlook 
for agricultural  products  are  the  uncertainties 
associated with the strength and duration of the eco- 
nomic  recovery,  future  developments  in  export 
demand, and probable production levels in both the 
livestock and crop sectors. It is generally assumed 
that output will expand in the year ahead, and that 
total demand will rise enough to lend some support 
to farm prices. However, favorable crop weather 
and expectations of good profit margins in livestock 
feeding will be a prerequisite to higher production 
levels  in ,1976. Although  the  demand  picture 
presently  looks  good,  conditions  can  suddenly 
change.  A  rekindling  of  inflation,  for  example, 
could seriously jeopardize the economic recovery, 
which  would  likely  have  a  harmful  effect  on 
agriculture. 
Crop Situation 
Due to large harvests in 1975, crop supplies for 
the current marketing year are sharply higher than a 
year ago (Table  1). The production of feed grains 
and wheat both hit record highs, pushing total sup- 
plies of these commodities up 20 per cent. Although 
soybean production did not match 1973's  record, 
the combination of a 23 per cent increase in produc- 
tion and a larger carryover boosted the total supply 
to an all-time high of 1.71 billion bushels. In con- 
trast to 1974-75,  when supplies were very  tight, 
grain stocks for the coming year appear ample for 
expanded domestic and foreign demand while still 
allowing for some  buildup in  the carryover  next 
summer and fall. This larger carryover will likely 
dampen  any  sharp  upward  movement  in  grain 
prices. 
The grain markets are still being buffeted by the 
weight of large domestic harvests and uncertainties 
about future sales to the Soviet Union. Following 
the lifting of  the embargo in October,  Russia did 
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purchase  additional  grain-bringing  the  total  for 
1975 to more than 13 million metric tons. However, 
instead of rising, prices fell. Apparently, the grain 
trade ascertained that even if Russia decided to push 
total purchases to 17 million tons, an amount about 
equal to her acquisitions in 1972-73, the supply of 
wheat and feed grains would easily stretch to the 
1976 harvests. 
In  the  last  marketing  year,  farmers  received 
prices  which  averaged  about  $4.00,  $3.00,  and 
$6.50 per bushel for wheat, corn, and soybeans, re- 
spectively. With the exception of wheat, which may 
average near last year's level, prices will likely av- 
erage  lower  in  the  current  marketing  year,  es- 
pecially for soybeans.  Furthermore,  the post-har- 
vest seasonal rise that normally occurs in the winter 
and spring months may be somewhat restricted this 
year unless foreign demand should strengthen fur- 
ther or the 1976 crop prospects run into difficulty. 
A sharp decline in production and a likely in- 
crease  in  U.S.  mill  consumption  highlight  the 
cotton  outlook.  With  relatively  stable  exports, 
ending carryover stocks for the 1975-76 marketing 
year should fall moderately below this year's level 
of 5.75 million  bales, which suggests that  prices 
will be reasonably good. Supplies of most fruits and 
vegetables are somewhat larger this year, but total 
demand promises to keep prices near, if not above, 
1974-75 levels. 
Livestock Situation 
Despite  the  improved  profitability  picture of 
recent months, cattle feeders and hog producers ap- 
parently  are  taking  a  guarded  approach  to ex- 
panding output, due to uncertainties about future 
cost-price  relationships.  Only  recently  has  there 
been  any  evidence  of  a  turnaround  in  hog  far- 
rowing~  and feedlot placements. In September, for 
example, hog producers reported that they planned 
to increase farrowings for the December 1975-Feb- 
ruary 1976 period 6 per cent above the same period 
a year earlier, but this will still be well below the 
levels posted  in  1973 and  1974.  The number of 
cattle placed in feedlots during the third quarter of 
1975 was 22 per cent higher than the very low levels 
of a year ago. Nevertheless, this increase in place- 
ments was sufficient to boost the total number of 
cattle on feed as of October 1, 1975, slightly above 
the previous year, the first such year-to-year gain 
since October 1973. 
Although livestock output now appears to be on 
the expansion path, actual production in  the year 
ahead will depend largely on how producers assess 
their potential profits. In the hog industry, the out- 
look is quite favorable, especially for the first half 
of 1976. Even though farrowings will be increasing 
rather sharply, pork production is not expected to 
exceed year-earlier levels until mid-year. Slaughter 
during the second half of the year will likely be large 
enough to offset an anticipated decline of about 10 
per cent in the kill rate during the first 6 months. 
Thus,  pork  supplies  in  1976  should  be  slightly 
larger than in 1975, which, on a per capita basis, 
were the lowest in 40 years. Although prices are not 
likely to surpass the $65 per hundredweight peak es- 
tablished  last  fall,  some seasonal  strength  may 
occur in the spring. But once supplies of pork and 
other red meats begin to expand more rapidly next 
summer, some retrenchment in  pork prices is ex- 
pected. For the year as a whole, prices on barrows 
and gilts will probably average a little below the $50 
per hundredweight estimated for 1975. 
The sharp rise in cattle and calf slaughter  in 
1975 apparently will stem the buildup in inventory 
numbers. It was estimated a year ago that the cattle 
inventory was 13  1.8 million head, and all of the ev- 
idence suggested that another increase would occur 
in 1975. However, a larger-than-anticipated death 
loss coupled with sharply higher slaughter rates for 
cows, calves, and non-fed steers and heifers have 
placed cattle numbers in better balance with market 
demand. Stopping the inventory  buildup will  not 
necessarily  result  in  higher  cattle  prices  in  the 
coming  year,  but  it  at least  sets  the  stage  for  a 
stronger and more profitable market at some point 
in the future. 
Looking at potential beef  supplies,  fed cattle 
marketings in the first quarter of 1976 will likely in- 
crease about 10 per cent above year-ago levels and 
15 per cent or so above the fourth quarter, 1975. 
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Furthermore, fed marketings in the second quarter 
should  also  be  up  sharply  from  the  year-earlier 
period.  Although  increases  of  these  magnitudes 
would normally presage a drop in price, marketings 
from  the  non-fed  sector  are expected  to  decline 
rather  significantly  during  the  winter  months. 
Therefore,  total  slaughter  during  the  January- 
March period  may be only 3 to 4 per cent larger 
than a year earlier,  which suggests that prices on 
choice steers and heifers will remain fairly strong. 
Reflecting a probable shift back to more grain-fed 
cattle and fewer non-fed steers, heifers, and calves, 
1976 production levels are expected to show a mod- 
erate increase over this  Although the  price 
outlook is mixed, most of the evidence suggests that 
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deteriorate significantly,  1976  ihbbld:&in- 
pare favorably with 1975  earnings. 'T,he dai6  Jn-. 
dustry has benefited from higher prices and lower 
feed costs in 1975. Milk production for the year is 
estimated  to  be  about equal  to the ,115.4 billion 
pounds produced in 1974. Some increase in output 
is likely for 1976, but the gain should not depress 
prices and incomes to any great extent. continuing  , . 
a trend of several years, lamb slaughter will prob- 
ably be down again in 1976. Howeyer, larger sup- .. 
plies of beef and pork will temper any price move- 
ments for lambs much above 1975 levels. 
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choice steer prices should average near the $45 per  On balance,  the agricultural picture for 1976 
hundredweight received this year. 
While improving, the outlook for the cow-calf 
producer is not particularly bright for 1976. Until 
the cattle inventory is liquidated further or profits in 
cattle feeding show greater promise, feeder cattle 
prices  are  likely  to  hover  around current  levels, 
showing at most some seasonal strength this spring. 
Conditions in 1977 and 1978, however, should be 
much better for the rancher. 
In response to more favorable prices, poultry 
and egg production has recently been expanding. 
This  expansion  will  likely  put  some  downward 
pressure on prices in the months ahead, but if the re- 
lationship between feed costs and prices does not 
appears good even though prices and net incomes 
may slip somewhat below  1975 levels. This eval- 
uation  presupposes,  however,  that  weather  con- 
ditions in the year ahead will be conducive for big 
crops and that profit  margins in livestock feeding 
will remain  generally favorable.  There is also an 
implicit assumption that the economy will continue 
to grow in 1976, which will afford higher levels of 
employment and larger disposable incomes. How- 
ever, because the wheel of fortune in agriculture is 
capable of producing surprising outcomes, farmers 
should exercise more than the usual amount of cau- 
tion in their production and marketing decisions in 
1976. 
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